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The complete story of the financial travail of American railroads and of the legal
devices and business expedients resorted to in an attempt to resolve their difficulties
is a history which is all too long to allow presentation in any but the most general
way within the limits of a short article. The high-spots, however, can be touched
upon.
The financial problems which faced the railroads of this country in the period of
the'r infancy,1 that is to say, in the era preceding i85o, were comparatively simple
and easy of solution. During this time financing was usually accomplished by the
sale of capital stock, rarely by the corporate mortgage. Under-estimation of the cost
of the project was the chief source of financial difficulty. When funds ran out, the
entrepreneurs put up or raised more money, issued additional stock, and carried the
construction to completion. It was with the advent of the corporate mortgage in
railroad financing in the era following 185o that the law and technique of corporate
reorganization in the United States had its real beginning.
In this period the mortgage was used with an increasingly lavish hand. The result
was that railroad financial troubles and the railroad mortgage became indissolubly
associated as the Siamese twins. It was thought that railroad revenues would con-
stantly increase with the development of the country, and that therefore relatively
heavy fixed charges could be sustained. In many cases, however, revenues did not
show the anticipated increase and the top-heavy mortgage set-up and inadequate
revenues forced many carriers to default on their mortgages. Financial misfortunes
of this type were especially prevalent in the times of severe economic stringency
when there was an inevitable shrinkage in railroad revenues. As a result of such
defaults the property securing the mortgage could be sold at foreclosure, or where
the mortgage so provided, it might be taken over and operated by the mortgage
trustee for the benefit of the bondholders. But in the period between i85o and the
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panic of 1873, resort to either of these alternatives was not frequent. Usually a settle-
ment was arranged between the debtor and the security-holders under which over-
due interest was funded. This course of action was dictated largely by technical
deficiencies in, and one-sided provisions of, railroad mortgages then in use? The
funding expedient, of course, afforded merely temporary relief and made the under-
lying financial situation of the debtor all the more critical, because no permanent
adjustments between income and outgo had been effected. The day of reckoning
was merely postponed. Later insolvencies were almost invariably the consequence.
The foundation for the modern equity reorganization technique was laid in the
period following i85o. This technique, as it was ultimately developed, involved
foreclosure and sale of the insolvent carrier's property to a new company formed to
take it over. The equity receivership was an essential ingredient of this process. It
may be explained that an equity receiver is a disinterested person who, according to
the usual definition, has been appointed by a court to hold or manage property which
is subject to a pending suit until the rights to the property have been judicially deter-
mined.4 While the property remains in the control of the receiver, it cannot, save
in unusual circumstances, be affected by other courts or persons.
After it became established that receivers might be appointed to take over the
operation of railroads, resort to the use of the receivership was most common in con-
nection with foreclosure proceedings instituted on behalf of the holders of defaulted
railroad bonds.5 From the bondholders' point of view, the appointment of a receiver
in connection with such proceedings had the advantage of taking the mortgaged
property from the possession of the debtor's management and permitting revenues
of the property to be applied on their obligations pending sale or foreclosure.
Although the mortgage foreclosure receivership was useful in some situations, it by
no means solved the bondholders' problems. This type of receivership extended only
to the property subject to the mortgage, which frequently was only a part of the
debtor's system. Since a railroad must be operated as a unit, this limitation greatly
reduced the utility of the foreclosure receivership. Where the railroad had a complex
aggregate of mortgages, legal machinery was needed which would extend the re-
ceivership to the entire system of the debtor and permit its centralized operation
pending the development of a plan of reorganization. Not only the bondholders but
also the railroad management felt this need. But it was not until 1884 that the well-
known Wabash receivership pointed the way to such a possibility.
By 1884, when the Wabash reorganization was instituted, it had become well
established that an equity receiver might be appointed, subject to certain limitations,
in connection with pending litigation against a railroad, where the application was
made on behalf of the debtor's creditors or stockholders.6 Defying precedent, the
'Crowdl, Railway Reeizvership in the Unitd States (1898) 7 YALn REV. 319, 326.
2 CrA lx, RECeiEs (2d ed., 1929) 1249. 4I CLuR, op. cit. supra note 3, at 15.
'Prior to 185o, it was not clear that receivers could be appointed to take over railroad operation. Id.
at 1249.
"This requirement of pending litigation was met, for example, where foreclosure of a defaulted mort-
gage was sought. Foreclosure constituted a pending suit brought by corporate creditors against the debtor.
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Wabash Company itself filed a bill in equity, which had no connection with any
pending suit, in which it requested the appointment of a receiver for its entire
property. The object of the bill was to place the Wabash properties in the lap of
the court until a reorganization could be accomplished. The bill alleged, among
other things, that the petitioner was insolvent and that unless a receiver was ap-
pointed, suits would be brought against it and its properties disintegrated, with great
resulting loss to creditors, stockholders, and the general public. The bill was sus-
tained and influenced reorganization profoundly, but certain doubts which were
cast upon its soundness, and the fact that the procedure there followed lacked a well-
formulated basis for effecting the reorganization once the receivership had been com-
menced, led to an ultimate departure from this technique.8 The reorganization
technique, as it was finally evolved following the Wabash case, was transformed
from one in which the company itself formally instituted receivership proceedings
in its own name to one in which a friendly creditor of the company was induced to
commence the receivership proceedings, ostensibly for himself but actually at the
instigation of the debtor.
Institution of Equity Reorganization Receiverships under the Modern Technique9
After a debtor's management had reached the decision that reorganization was
necessary, attorneys for the company drew up all necessary legal papers in great
secrecy, in order to prevent creditors from anticipating the receivership and subject-
ing important property to their daims or from instituting unfriendly receivership
proceedings in the state courts.10 Then a friendly creditor of the company was sought
who was willing to file a petition requesting the appointment of a receiver for the
debtor. In order that statutes governing the institution of suits in the federal courts
might be complied with, it was necessary for him to reside in a state other than that
of the incorporation of the debtor, and to have a claim exceeding $3,ooo.U The
federal courts have been preferred for railroad reorganizations for the reason, among
others, that the systems of the insolvent carriers frequently extend into several states,
and if the state courts were used, separate receivership proceedings would have to
be commenced in each state in which the railroad's properties lay. While it is also
true that separate proceedings, called ancillary proceedings, must be instituted in
each federal judicial district through which the debtor's system runs, the intimacy
existing between the various federal district courts is much greater than between
state courts, and the federal courts of the ancillary proceedings usually allow the
'For a more detailed discussion of the receivership background of the Wabash reorganization, see
Chamberlain, New-Fashioned Receivership (1896) io HtAv. L. REv. r39.
* See Byrne, The Foredosure of Rwroad Mortgages in the United States Courts in SomE LrGAL. PHA
oF CoRaOATE FINANCING, REORGASAlzAorto MRzcuATOR (1917) 77, 86 et seq.
' A generalized description of the equity reorganization process is here set forth. Individual variations
from certain aspects of the process may be found. For a more detailed and technical discussion of the
manner of instituting railroad receivership proceedings, see id. at 77 et seq.
"Although the past tense is used in describing the equity reorganization receivership, this procedure.
may still be used, but it has been largely superseded by the new statutory bankruptcy reorganization.
See p. 384, infrs. 1136 StAr. og1 (igti).
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court in which the primary proceedings have been instituted to control the operation
of the entire railroad system.
The receivership proceedings were instituted through filing a petition for appoint-
ment of a receiver in the federal district court of the district in which the carrier's
chief operating offices and a material part of its line were located?12 Similar bills
were simultaneously filed, as was noted above, in all other district courts in which
the debtor had important properties. The bills alleged, among other things, that the
defendant was iridebted to the plaintiff and was insolvent; that there were other
creditors whose debts had matured and which the company was unable to pay; and
that it would be dismembered through attachment and execution if a receiver was
not appointed and its assets administered. The allegations of these bills were ad-
mitted by the debtor who joined in the prayer for the appointment of a receiver.
Courts of the ancillary proceedings usually appointed as their receivers the same
individuals named as receivers by the court of the primary proceedings. It was cus-
tomary for the court to name two or more receivers, one of whom was usually an
officer of the debtor experienced with its operations.
Shortly after the receivership proceedings were instituted, the mortgage trustees
under defaulted mortgages obtained the court's permission to commence foreclosure
proceedings. The foreclosure bill, in connection with which a receiver of the mort-
gaged property was requested, was filed with the receivership court sitting in the
district within which the property was located. The receivership was extended to
the mortgage foreclosure suit by court order, and the persons named as receivers in
the original receivership bill were usually named receivers in the foreclosure pro-
ceedings.
When the foregoing steps had been taken, the reorganization proceedings may
be said to have been completely launched. The long-range objective thereof, namely,
the foreclosure of the debtor's property and sale to the new company, would usually,
however, be several long and weary years away. In the meantime, a plan of reor-
ganization had to be devised and adequate support obtained for it. The so-called
protective or reorganization committee system performed this function.
The Protective Committee System in Equity Reorganization
Since railroad properties are so extensive and valuable that outside bidders are
almost unknown at their foreclosure, the investors in the old company were com-
pelled to get together and acquire the property themselves if they hoped to salvage
any portion of their original investment. This they almost invariably did by forming
a new company to take over the properties. And if the new company was to be
financially sound, it was necessary that its fixed charges should be materially lower
than those of its predecessor. The situation, therefore, required investors of the old
company to accept obligations of the new having a lesser face amount or reduced
interest, or perhaps to take all or some portion of their claims against the former in
stock or other contingent securities of the new company. Other classes of creditors
a" Farmea' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific . Co., 72 Fed. a6 (1896).
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and stockholders, if they were permitted to participate in the reorganization at all,
were required to make similar sacrifices. The complicated adjustments incident to
such a xe-shuffling of corporate interests obviously could not be worked out on a
town nieting basis, even if it had been possible to bring together at one place thou-
sands of scattered creditor and equity interests. The protective committee system
was designed to permit the accomplishment of these re-adjustments.
Protective committees were self-constituted groups, formed to represent the
various creditor and stock interests of the insolvent carrier. Usually each creditor or
equity class had its separate committee. The common-stock committee was'likely to
be sponsored and dominated by the management of the debtor; bondholder com-
mittees by the investment bankers originally selling the issues to the public.13 Rival
committees, backed by diverse interests, frequently put in an appearance. Creditors
and stockholders were solicited by their respective committees to deposit their securi
ties with the committees pursuant to the terms of what is known as a deposit agree.
ment. This agreement conferred broad powers on the committees and authorized
them, among other things, to take all necessary steps to protect the depositors in
connection with the reorganization proceedings and in the furtherance and develop-
ment of a plan of reorganization.' 4 The plan of reorganization was, at least in
theory, the result of prolonged negotiations carried on among the various commItte-es.
No mathematical basis existed for the determination of what interests particular
classes of creditors or stockholders of the insolvent debtor should have in the reor-
ganized company. The treatment accorded individual classes depended on such
factors as the strength of their claims, the ability of the committees representing
them, and the integrity with which their interests were protected.
A key problem facing protective committees was that of raising sufficient money
to make reorganization- possible. These funds were usually provided through the
adoption of a reorganization plan calling for the sale of new first-mortgage bonds
to a banking syndicate and by levying a so-called "assessment" on the junior equity
or creditor interests of the old company. Under the assessment plan the junior
interests were permitted to obtain securities in the new company only upon payment
of a designated amount of money.- Because of the uncertainty involved in the raising
of needed money in this way, the reorganization plans almost invariably provided
for an underwriting of the proposed sale of securities to the junior interests.
After a plan of reorganization was agreed upon by the committees -dominating
the reorganization, their depositors were notified that a copy of the proposed plan
had been lodged at a designated place where it might be examined by them. Those
who were dissatisfied were permitted to withdraw their securities upon payment of
their pro-rated share of the committee expenses. Provision was usually made that
" DEVw1N, op. cit. supra note 1, at 1104.
"For a more detailed description of deposit agreements and related problems, see Cravath, The Reor-
ganization of Corporations in SOME LroMA. PstAsfs oF COaPORATE FINANCING, REORGANIZATrON AND REOULA-
TION (1917) 153, 162 eA seq.
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failure of a depositor to withdraw his securities within a stipulated period constituted
an acceptance of the proposed plan.
Foreclosure and Sale of the Property and Consummation of the Plan
After the dominating protective committees bad decided that their plan had the
support necessary to make a reorganization possible, a decree of foreclosure of the
debtor's property was sought. In connection with the foreclosure proceedings a hear-
ing was held in which the court set a price known as the upset price below which it
would not permit the property to be sold. This price was set in order to prevent
creditors and stockholders supporting the reorganization plan from acquiring the
property at an unconscionably low figure. This was a frank recognition of the fact
that in most cases involving large railroad properties the latter group was the only
possible purchaser.'5
At the sale on foreclosure the property was bid in by representatives of creditors
and stockholders of the old company, known as the purchase committee, and there-
after it was transferred to a new corporation which had been formed to take it over.
After x92o it was necessary for the new company to receive the Interstate Commerce
Commission's approval of the securities it proposed to issue.16 Securities in the new
company were then delivered to those participating in the reorganization plan on the
basis therein provided. Those refusing to acquiesce in the reorganization plan were
paid in cash their pro rata share, if any, of the price for which the property was sold
on foreclosure.
The transfer of the railroad properties to the new company terminated the reor-
ganization proceedings for most practical purposes, and if no doctrines of reorganiza-
tion law had been violated, the new company took the property of the old, free of
all the latter's debts which were junior to the foreclosed mortgages. The reorganized
company started its life subject only to the undisturbed mortgages of the old com-
pany and to the obligations which it assumed under the reorganization plan.
The Doctrine of Northern Pacific Railway v. Boyd
The Boyd" case established, or at least made dear, an important limitation on
the rights of stockholders to participate in reorganizations. Prior to this case, it had
been assumed that if mortgaged railroad property was foreclosed and sold for less
than the amount of the mortgage, purchasing bondholders were privileged to deal
with the acquired property as they saw fit. This notion, however, received a rude
jolt in the Boyd case. In this case the Northern Pacific Railroad had been reor-
ganized through the foreclosure and sale of its property to the Northern Pacific Rail-
SThe advantage in favor of those supporting the plan having overwhelming support is easily per-
ceived. If a corner lot, having a $5,ooo mortgage thereon, is sold on foreclosure for $3,ooo rad is bid
in by the mortgagee, the latter is entitled to credit the amount of the debt on the price which he paid
for the property. Hence, he merely has to put up enough money in such circumstances to pay the expenses
of foreclosure sale. Similarly a purchase committee representing 95% of the bondholders are entitled to
a credit of 95% of the sale price of the property which they arc purchasing. The holders of the remain-
ing % of the securities would have only a 5% credit. This large differential can usually be counted
upon to prevent the minorities from effectively bidding at foreclosure sales.
26 41 STAT. 494 (1920). 1T a28 U. S. 482 (1913).
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way Company. The bondholders' reorganization plan provided that stockholders of
the old company might obtain an interest in the new by making a specified cash
payment. No provision was made for participation in the plan for general unsecured
creditors of the old company. Ten years after the reorganization had been completed,
Boyd, an unsecured and unpaid creditor of the old company, brought suit against
the reorganized company. He asserted that since no provision had been made for
his claim, the transfer of the assets of the old company was fraudulent, and that
consequently the transferee company was liable for the debt of its predecessor. The
claim of Boyd was sustained, and a decree was entered making his claim a lien on
the property of the reorganized company. The rationale of the decision was that
bondholders, who might have purchased the property for themselves alone, could
not permit stockholders to obtain an interest in the new company pursuant to an
arrangement made before the sale, without also giving every creditor of the old the
privilege of participating in the reorganization on a fair and equitable basis. The
Boyd decision was variously described as the demon incarnate and as a perpetual
spectre across the path of corporate reorganization. A profound fear existed that the
Supreme Court's requirement of a fair and equitable plan of reorganization was
such a vague and uncertain guide that those creditors who had not become parties
to the reorganization would be able to contest the fairness of- the reorganization
many years after it had been consummated and to hold the new company liable for
the debts of its predecessor where the judgment returned was that the reorganization
plan was unfair as to them. Such a possibility was obviously a serious threat to the
efficacy of the reorganization process, as the estimate of the fairness of the plan years
after the event would all too likely be influenced by hindsight rather than foresight.
Steps were immediately taken, however, to plug the reorganization hole which
had been revealed by the Boyd case.' The expedient adopted was to have the fair-
ness of the reorganization plan litigated in the foreclosure proceedings. This was
done by inserting in the decree of foreclosure a provision that the sale would not be
confirmed by the court unless, after hearing, it was satisfied that a fair and timely
offer of participation had been made to all creditors of the old company. Provision
was also made for notifying creditors of the terms of the decree, of the filing of the
reorganization plan, and of the hearing to be held thereon. The result of the new
procedure was that all creditors of the old company, whether or not they were parties
to the reorganization proceedings, became bound by the terms of the plan upon
confirmation of the sale of the properties. In the words of one writer, the doctrine of
the Boyd case became reasonably domesticated.
Criticism of the Equity Reorganization Process
Dissatisfaction with various aspects of the equity reorganization scheme mounted
with the years. The cumulative effect of a wasteful system of ancillary proceedings,
the necessity for the essentially ritualistic sale on foreclosure of the insolvent's
" See Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Devdopments of the Last Decade in SomE LwAa
Pmnss oF CoRoRATm FWANciNG, REORGANZATION AND REGuLAToN (x93z) 133, X42 et seq.
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property, the fees exacted by the numerous protective committees, reorganization
managers, mortgage trustees, receivers, and their. counsel, contributed to make reor-
ganization costs exorbitant, if not scandalous.19 Reorganizations were dominated
all too frequently by investment banking interests who, through their influence
over protective committees, were enabled to shape reorganization plans to their own
ends.2 0  Protective committees, assuming to represent various classes of security-
holders, often had interests which conflicted with those of their depositors2 1 Too
frequently reorganizations were financially unsound. 22 Fixed charges often were
not adequately reduced, 23 and it was not uncommon for a reorganized company'to
emerge from reorganization with a larger total capitalization than that of its pred-
ecessor.24 Nor did the authority of the ICC over the issuance of securities result in
material improvement of the financial structures of the reorganized companies. The
Commission's control was brought to bear so late in the proceedings that it usually
gave its reluctant approval to unsound capital structures in order to avoid the costs
of prolonged receivership. 5 Reorganization plans, too, were frequently unfair. The
judges were too busy carefully to examine the plans proposed,26 and they, like the
ICC, were brought into the proceedings at the very end of the process, at a time
when they were reluctant to upset the result of years of labor.
The rumblings of discontent over the equity system reached a climax in the last
days of the Hoover regime, when a dangerously large number of railroads were
either already in receivership or on the verge. Congress then enacted under its
federal bankruptcy power a comprehensive system of statutory reorganization for the
railroads of the country.
Tm STATUTORY SCHEME
Institution of Proceedings and Control -of the Properties
The new reorganization statute, known as Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act 21
provided that interstate railroads which were insolvent or unable to meet their debts
as they matured, might be reorganized in the federal bankruptcy courts.28 The
rehabilitation proceedings could be instituted through filing a petition requesting
reorganization in a federal bankruptcy court by the carrier itself, or, where approval
of the ICC was first obtained, by creditors having 5% of its total outstanding in-
debtedness (§77a). On approval of the petition the debtor might be left in possession
of its property, or one or more trustees might be appointed to take over its operation
" See testimony of Commissioner Joseph B. Eastman, Hearings before Committee on the Judiciary on
H. R. 6429, 7 4th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 14.
'*REPORT TO SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIoATION OF THI
WoRK, Ac-nvmrs, PE.soNNEL AND FUNIc'oNs OF PRo'TCTIvE AND REORGANIZATION CoMMInu (1937)
863 et seq.
a1 REPORT TO SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMIssIoN, supra note 2o, at 863 et seq.
"MouLroN et at., THE AmERcAN TRANSPORTATI-n PROBLEM (1933) 321.
2 3A SHRFmmN, THE INTERsTATE COMMERCE CoMmssioN (1935) 584.
2 DEWIN, op. cit. supra note x, at 1159.
" MOULTON et al., op. cit. supra note 22, at 350, 356.
"Frank, Some Realistlic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L
REV. 541, 565. " 47 STAT. 1474 (1933).
2" The statute did not abolish the equity receivership. See J77k
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(§77c). The provision allowing the debtor to continue in possession where no trus-
tee was appointed was an innovation in reorganization practice. It was based on the
theory that financial misfortunes occasioning reorganization may be due neither to
inefficiency nor to culpability of the debtor's management, and that in such circum-
stances the properties should be left in the hands of those familiar with its operation.
Where trustees were appointed, however, they were to be selected from a panel of
standing trustees, designated in advance by the ICC (§77c).
Once the initiatory proceedings received the court's blessing,2 9 the debtor or
trustees, as the case might be, were vested with title to the property and authority to
operate the business, subject, however, to the control of the judge and of the ICC,
as provided in the Interstate Commerce Act (§77c). The reorganization court was
likewise vested with exclusive jurisdiction over all of the property of the debtor, even
though portions might lie in other judicial districts (§7a), thereby eliminating the
necessity for expensive and relatively inefficient ancillary proceedings characteristic
of the equity reorganization process. Appropriate provisions also operated to stay
creditor actions affecting the debtor's property (§771). Creditors and stockholders
were required to file their claims (§77c(5)) and the judge was ordered to clasg4y
them for voting on the reorganization plan later to be formulated (§77c(5)).
Procedure for Formulation of Reorganization Plans
The basic objective of the new statute was to provide machinery which would
avoid the undue delay and inordinate costs of the equity reorganization process and
at the same time assure the development of fair, equitable, and financially sound
reorganization plans by means of administrative and judicial safeguards which were
lacking or inadequate in the equity reorganization process. The ICC was required
to hold public hearings after due notice, at which creditors or stockholders were
entitled to be heard on proposed reorganization plans (§77c(9)) before they could
be finally asked to accept any reorganization plan (§77d). At these hearings the
debtor was directed to present its proposed plan, and trustees of the debtor and
persons representing not less than io% in amount of the claims of any class of
creditors might likewise propose reorganization plans (§77d). Following a hearing
on proposed plans, the Commission was directed to render a report recommending a
plan of reorganization which might differ from any plan which had been submitted
to it (§7 7d). No plan might become effective without the prior approval of the
Commission (§q7d, e, f), nor could one be approved by the Commission or the court
unless it was equitable, did not discriminate unfairly in favor of any class of creditors
or stockholders, was financially feasible, and in the public interest (§77d, f, g). The
influence of the principle of equity reorganizations, that the reorganization plan shall
be fair and equitable, is to be clearly discerned in these provisionsP0
"The judge was required to approve the petition if he was satisfied that it was filed in good faith
and complied with the technical requirements of the Act. 577a.
"The words "fair and equitable" as used in the statute are words of art which have acquired a fixed
meaning through judicial interpretation in the field of equity receivership reorganization. Cf. Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U. S. io6, xx5 (1939).
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Provisions Relating to Creditor and Stockholder Acceptance of Reorganization Plans
A great practical difficulty of the equity reorganization process lay in the necessity
of having available sufficient cash to pay reorganization expenses, provide new
capital, and satisfy the claims of the unpredictable number of creditors who might
refuse to participate in the reorganization.3 1 Accordingly it was felt that the reor-
ganization process should be democratized, so that creditor and stockholder minorities
would be bound by majority decision. Section 77 therefore provided that a plan of
securities readjustment Which was approved by the ICC, confirmed by the court,
and accepted by a two-thirds majority in amount of any class of creditors or stock-
holders, should become binding upon the remainder of the class (§77e, g, h).
Congress recognized, however, that it was unlikely that the acquiescence of a
majority of al classes of creditors and stockholders could be obtained in all situations.
Obstructionist tactics on the part of dissenting classes, not to mention the bona fide
dissent of investors who would feel that they were being unjustly dealt with,
appeared inevitable. In order to prevent dissenting classes of either stockholders or
creditors from blocking reorganization unless their demands were met-demands
which might easily become extortionate-steam-roller provisions were included in
the statute which made their acquiescence unnecessary in certain circumstances
(§77e). The consent of any class or classes of creditors or stockholders was dispensed
with where (i) a plan of reorganization provided for the payment in cash, at the
claimant's option, either of the value of his claim or the value of the securities
allocated under the plan to his interest in the old company, or (2) where provision
was made in the reorganization plan for a sale of the debtor's property to the reor-
ganized company at a price not less than that to be fixed by the ICC, called the
upset price (§77g, e). Where reorganization was based on sale at an upset price, non-
acquiescing classes of creditors and stockholders were entitled to cash payment of
such proportion of the sale price as was allocable to their interests.3 2 Shareholder
acquiescence was likewise dispensed with under the steam-roller provisions where it
was established that their equity in the enterprise was gone (§77g, e). 3 And bond-
holder acceptance was made unnecessary where the reorganization plan provided
for a sale of the debtor's property subject to their liens (§77g).
Proceedings for Confirmation and Consummation of Reorganization Plans
A plan of reorganization which was approved by the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission and accepted by the requisite majorities of creditors and stockholders, unless
that consent was made unnecessary, was required to be certified to the court by the
*'See Swaine, Corporate Reorganization under the Federal Bankrupty Power (1933) x9 VA. L. Rv.
317, 326.
"'The upset-price provision, it might be noted, was borrowed from the equity reorganization process
where it was habitually set so low as to have the effect of driving dissatisfied minorities into reorganization
plans. Weiner, Conflicting Functions of the Upset Phice in a Corporate Reorganization (1927) 27 CoL.
L. REv. 132, 137, n. 28.
"' Their consent could also be dispensed with where their interests were not to be adversely affected
by the plan, or where by authorized corporate action the plan had been accepted by their company and
they were bound by its acceptance. 577e-
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Commission, together with the latter's report of the proceedings (§7f). After such
certification, the judge held public hearings on the approved plan, at which time he
considered the stockholders' and creditors' objections, and confirmed the plan if it
complied with the requirements of the Act (§77g). The provisions for the court
hearings were undoubtedly introduced to minimize the chance of a successful chal-
lenge of the statute's validity on constitutional grounds. It is to be doubted, though,
that the draftsmen of the Act expected that the judges would, except possibly on
rare occasions, concern themselves with a detailed examination of reorganization
plans theretofore approved, and perhaps formulated, by the ICC after the full
hearings required by the Act. 4
A plan of reorganization which was confirmed by the court was made binding
on the debtor and on all of its creditors arid stockholders (§77h). The property of
the insolvent was thereafter transferred to the reorganized company which received
it free from all obligations of the old enterprise, save as otherwise provided in the
reorganization plan (77j). The costly and essentially ritualistic sale on foreclosure
was eliminated through a provision permitting the debtor's property to be retained
by it or transferred to another corporation without foreclosure (§J).
The Protective Committee and the New Legislation
Under the new legislation the protective committee system was shorn of a con-
siderable amount of the power which it possessed in the equity reorganization. Court
and administrative controls over the formulation of reorganization plans were intro-
duced at a sufficiently early stage of the reorganization process to make their existence
effective (§§77d, e; f). Then, too, the committee system was weakened by the ref-
erendum set-up of the statute. The ICC was required to refer its recommended plan
directly to stockholders and creditors (§77d) .' s If securities had been deposited with
a protective committee before the Commission's recommended plan was announced,
the committee apparently was permitted to vote on deposited securities only in the
event it was authorized to do so by a new authority executed after promulgation of
the plan (§77e).3 6 This provision, in the opinion of the writer, was introduced to
prevent voting power from falling into the hands of protective committees through
sheer inertia on the part of depositors, and because it was undoubtedly thought that
the prestige of plans recommended by the ICC would be sufficient to influence in-
vestors to accept them even though they should be opposed by such committees.
The new legislation, however, made no attempt to regulate the protective committee
system with respect to possible unfair solicitation practices, the use of one-sided
deposit agreements, and its failure to provide disinterested depositor representation37
"This view is supported by the fact that court consideration of the plan was not brought to bear
until after there had beea a submission to creditor and stock interests. 177 d,-f85 It might also, if it saw fit, submit any other plan which had been filed in the proceedings 57d.
"For a contrary point of view, see Rogers and Groom, Reorganizedon of Rat7road Corporations undr,
Secfion 77 of the Bankruptcy -ct (1933) 33 CoL. L. RE. 571, 61o.
. " The Securities Act of 1933 (48 STAT. 74) applied to certificates of deposit issued by protective com-
mittees. It did not, though, attempt to regulate the terms of such agreements or the personnel of the
committees. Committees were, however, compelled to disclose important information, such as their past
388 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Miscellaneous Provisions
Limitations of space prevent more than a brief reference to some miscellaneous
provisions for reorganization control which were introduced by the new legislation.
Expenses to be paid from the estate of the debtor, including compensation to trustees
and their counsel, to reorganization committees, managers, and other creditor and
stockholder representatives, were required to be fixed by the court within maximum
limits prescribed by the ICC (§77c(8)). It was thought that these limitations did
not prevent protective committees from making private arrangements with their
depositors concerning their remuneration and expenses. 38 Claims for personal injury
to employees were made preferred claims, outranking even first mortgages (§77s).
Judges and trustees were prohibited from recognizing "yellow dog" contracts (§77p),
from promoting company unions (§77p) or, with certain restrictions, from changing
employees' wages or working conditions (§77o).
THE AMENDMENTS OF 1935
General Scheme of the Amended Act
The experience with Section 77 indicated the desirability of further reorganization
reform and in 1935 the Federal Coordinator of Transportation recommended a com-
prehensive revision of the Act. In the same year, after extensive hearings, Congress
enacted the proposed legislation in general accordance with the Coordinator's recom-
mendations.
Although the original Act was overhauled from stem to stern-scarcely a sentence
of the original Act remaining unchanged-its underlying conception was retained.
Proceedings under the new Act may be instituted by a carrier in the same way and
are subject to the same conditions (§77a). Creditors, however, may now institute
proceedings without the prior approval of the ICC (§77a). 9 The appointment of
trustees for the debtor is required under the amended Act (§77c)f 0 the trustees
to be selected, not from a panel as before, but by the judges subject to the approval
of the Commission."' The Commission retains its key position with respect to the
formulation of and veto over reorganization plans (§77d) and control over reor-
ganization expenses (§77c(i2)). In order to expedite reorganizations where that is
desirable, the debtor is dhected to present a proposed reorganization plan within six
months after the approval of the reorganization petition (§77d) . 2 Permission to file
affiliations, the circumstances surrounding their organization, etc. See SEC, Form D-1. They could,
however, obtain an exemption under the Securities Act, §3(a)(2), by obtaining court approval of the terms
of their deposit agreement in advance of solicitation. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (48
STAT. 881) committees were required to file a listing application in conformance with that Act, if their
certificates of deposit were to be listed on a national security exchange.
"
8 Rogers and Groom, supra note 36, at 587.
'This change was made because the original Act provided no standard for determining the circum- '
stances in which such approval should be given or withheld.
"An exception was made with respct to small carriers whose annual operating revenues were less
than $Sooo,ooo a year.
" One reason for this change was the difficulty experienced by the Commission located in Washington
in selecting for the panel suitable persons living in other parts of the country.
"This period may be extended, for cause shown, for intervals not exceeding six months each. 177d.
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proposed plans is extended to stockholders having not less than io% of any class of
stock, and to other interested parties who obtain the consent of the Commission
(§77d). The order of procedure for reference on reorganization plans is greatly
improved.42 The amended Act provides that a proposed reorganization plan shall
be certified to the court after approval by the Commission and before it is submitted
to creditors and stockholders (§77d). If court approval is withheld, the plan may be
merely returned to the Commission for further consideration (577e). Under the
original scheme a costly and time-consuming submission to creditors and stockholders
would have been rendered useless where the court refused to approve the submitted
plan.
The amended Act retains the provisions for majority creditor and stockholder
control of reorganization (§77e). Continued also, although amended in certain re-
spects, are the steam-roller provisions permitting the effectuation of reorganizations
over the objections of non-acquiescing classes of creditors and stockholders (§77e).
The changes made in this connection, together with the new so-called "cram-down"
provisions of the amended Act, will be discussed later. And, as under the original
Act, the reorganized company obtains the properties of the debtor free from all old
debts save as otherwise provided in the confirmed reorganization plan (§77f).
Defects in the Valuation and Upset Price Provisions of the Original Statute
The steam-roller provisions of the original statute, which were designed to permit
reorganization over the objections of dissenting classes of creditors or stockholders,
were key provisions of the legislation (§T7e). Unless they possessed a high degree of
practicability, the new reorganization technique was likely to be ineffective in an
important number of instances, because reorganization plans proposed thereunder
probably would not be acceptable to all classes of creditors and stockholders. Under
one of the steam-roller provisions the consent of classes was dispensed with where
the reorganization plan provided for a sale of the debtor's property at not less than a
fair upset price (§T7g). This provision was thought to be defective and of little
practical utility. Both courts and scholars were in wide disagreement concerning the
proper basis for determining the upset price.4 The chaotic condition of the law and
the uncertainty concerning the principles applicable to upset-price determination
were regarded as making it unsound to rely on the upset-price technique as a prin-
cipal means of implementing reorganization. The jumbled state of the law, too, was
all too likely to encourage costly and undesirable obstructive litigation.
The other important provision dispensing with investor acquiescence was based
on the payment in cash of the value, if any, of the interest of dissenting classes. Share-
holder consent was made unnecessary both where the company was found to be
insolvent (§77e), ie., where the value of its assets was less than the aggregate of its
debts, and where the reorganization plan provided for appraisal of their interests
4S For procedure under original statute, see pp. 385-387, suPra.
"Bonbright and Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporar
Zeorgauizwaion (1928) aS Co1. L. REv. 127.
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and for cash payment of the value thereof (§77g). The latter provisions also applied
to dissenting classes of corporate creditors (§7g). These provisions for eliminating
creditor and stockholder acquiescence were regarded as unsatisfactory because it
was feared that, in the absence of applicable legislation, principles of valuation as
applied in rate-making proceedings might be invoked." The difficulties inherent in
the valuation of great railroad properties on the basis of rate-making principles,
together with the enormous costs and intolerable delays accompanying their applica-
tion, would have made a dead letter of the appraisal provisions. With the upset-price
provisions impracticable and the appraisal provisions ineffective, the likelihood
seemed great that the Act would fail as an effective reorganization vehicle. Accord-
ingly a highly important innovation was included in the amended legislation. The
method of approach was to make the appraisal provisions workable. This was done
through incorporation of a comprehensive formula specifying the basis upon which
valuations were to be made. In the formula the emphasis was shifted from the fac-
tors giving rise to the difficulties in rate-making valuations to the ultimate economic
basis of all industrial plant valuation-the earning power of the properties (577e).
The "Cram-Down" Provisions of the z935 Amendments
Under the amended Act a plan of securities readjustment may become binding
on dissenting classes of creditors or stockholders, even though they are offered no
alternative of cash payment for their interests in the old company (57e). These
so-called "cram-down" provisions may be invoked, however, only where the court
finds, after hearing, that the reorganization plan makes adequate provision for the
dissenters' interests and that their rejection of the approved scheme of securities
readjustment is not reasonably justified. It was expected that these provisions would
be used only in extraordinary situations. They were added because it was thought
that particular, ieorganizations might be seriously impeded or prevented through
inability to raise the amount of cash which would otherwise be necessary. While
these provisions provoked charges of unconstitutionality,48 they were defended on
the seemingly sound basis that the accomplishment of fair and sound reorganizations,
which are required both in the public and private interest, would be rendered difficult
if not impossible if cash payment to dissenting classes were an invariable require-
ment.4T
Amendments Pertaining to Classification of Creditors and Stockholders
As originally enacted, Section 7 was thought to be defective in that it elevated
dissenting groups to a position of undeserved strength. It required a division of
creditors and stockholders into separate classes according to the nature of their re-
spective interests (§77c(5)). This provision was interpreted by the courts in such a
"
5 In the Hearings before the Committee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (t935) 152,
215 et seq., 291 et seq., the equity interest vigorously advanced this point of view.
"Friendly, Amendment of the Railroad Reorganization Act (x936) 36 Cot. L RnV. 27, 32.
"For a more elaborate argument supporting the constitutionality of these provisions, me Craven and
Fuller, The z935 Amendments of the Railroad Bankruptcy Act (1936) 49 HARV. L Ray. 1254.
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way as to encourage proliferation of classes, which naturally resulted in an undue
strengthening of minority groups.48 The opportunities of such groups for quick and
aggressive opposition were greater where individual classes consisted of a single or
perhaps a few creditors, than would have been true if they had been submerged in
the membership of a large class. The amended statute was designed to discourage
such over-classification.
The Protective Committee and the Amended Act
The amended Act envisaged an increase in the influence of the protective com-
mittee system. Under its terms proposed plans of reorganization may be submitted
directly to protective committees as representatives for security depositors (§77e, p).
The relaxing of the stringency of the old Act in this respect, however, was more
than compensated for by the introduction of new and highly important provisions
subjecting such committees to strict regulation (§77p). It was made unlawful for
any person to solicit proxies or authority to represent creditor or stockholder interests
in connection with pending reorganization proceedings without first obtaining the
approval of the ICC. In passing on applications under this section, the Commission
considers, among other things, such relevant matters as the manner of proposed
solicitation, the rate of compensation to be charged by the applicant, his business
connections and other committee interests which might be inconsistent with dis-
interested representation, and the terms of the proxy authorization or deposit agree-
ment under which the applicant proposes to act.4
Miscellaneous Provisions under the Amended Ac
A number of particularly important miscellaneous changes in the original Act
should be mentioned in passing. Section 77 was interpreted by the Supreme Court
as requiring prompt reorganization, even though conditions were such that a slow
tempo might be in the better interests of all concerned. 10 Accordingly the statute
was amended to ease the requirement of prompt reorganization and to permit court
retention of the proceedings so long as there was not an undue delay (§77g).
The provision permitting the allowance of compensation (§77c(8)) to protective
committees and reorganization managers out of the debtor's estate was eliminated.
Under the amended Act such committees might obtain from the estate of the debtor
only their actual and reasonable expense, including reasonable attorney's fees
(§77c(=)). 51 Other amendments permit mortgage trustees to file claims on behalf
of bondholders who have failed to act in their own behalf (§77c(7)). The original
Act required the compilation from the records of the debtor of a list of all its
"In the pending Missouri Pacific case, the stock and creditor interests were originally classified into
72 different groups.
"See Fennell, Protective Committees and Deposit Afgreements in Railroad Reorganization (939) 49
YALE I. J. 224, 230 et seq.; Fennell, The Protection of Security-Holders' Interests under Section 77,
inra p. 477 et seq.
"Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago Pacific Railway, 294 U. S. 648 (r935).
"The wisdom of this change is not dear, but, at the time the bill was enacted, Congressional disap-
proval of committee charges was too great to permit an objective approach to the problem.
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creditors and stockholders and this list was open to inspection by designated parties
in interest (§c(9)). The utility of this provision was limited by the fact that bond-
holder lists were likely to be in the hands of persons other than the debtor, such as
the paying agents under the debtor's mortgages, for example. Accordingly the statute
was amended to provide that any person having such a list should be under the duty
to supply it (§Hc(5)).
The railroad reorganization process, as it developed from the earliest stages, has
been characterized by a constant endeavor on the part of courts and lawyers to adjust,
adapt and evolve legal machinery which would adequately cope with the enormously
difficult problems of the insolvent carrier. The progress which was made was slow
and halting for many years, for shaping antiquated legal machinery to meet the new
needs was a formidable task. Had legislative aid been forthcoming at the outset,
the problem would have been greatly simplified. When it did come, though after
many years, a long step was made toward the goal of sound, fair and reasonably
inexpensive railroad reorganizations. Experience with the statute, however, revealed
important deficiencies. This was hardly a surprise, as perfection in new legislation
concerned with such complex problems was hardly to be expected. Extensive amend-
ments attacking these deficiencies constitut.d a further stride toward the reorganiza-
tion goal. Now that the barricade of legislative indifference has been shattered, it
is to be hoped that such shortcomings as may have been revealed in the existing
legislation -will receive the prompt Congressional attention required by the importance
to the country of a sound system of railroad transportation.
